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After Myanmar first showed signs of political reforms in 2011, foreign strategic                       
interests have been flowing into the country in the forms of trade and economic                           
relations, infrastructure investment, and security cooperation, thanks to its rich natural                     
resources, geostrategic location, and favorable government reforms for the entrants.                   
Today, Myanmar is in a key position to leverage these foreign interests, specifically                         
from Japan, the U.S., India and ASEAN, to achieve a more balanced foreign relations,                           
away from its prior dependence on China.  
 
Whether Myanmar succeeds in the difficult and admirable task of moving to                       
democracy and openness will depend primarily on the commitment and hard work of                         
its own leaders and its people. Outsiders must work with the people of Myanmar,                           
government, officials, private organizations and other leaders to understand what will                     
and will not work the most appropriate timeframe for achieving the goals that the key                             
actors share. This paper will examine the various activities in Myanmar by the foreign                           
powers and the competition among them, to understand each player’s motivations and                       
offerings, and to ultimately make policy recommendations to the Myanmar                   













1. Vast Natural Resources and Opportunities in Infrastructure  
2. Geostrategic Value  



































































































The rapid developments in Myanmar today deserve a comprehensive examination and                     
recognition. After Myanmar undertook symbolic political reforms in 2011 toward a                     
more democratic government, many foreign states have moved quickly to establish                     
multi­faceted bilateral relations with Myanmar. This paper seeks to understand this                     
strategic competition, ​the competition for influence by the foreign states in Myanmar                       
to the extent their policy and actions are strategically aimed to fulfill its own national                             
economic, political, security, and social agenda​, and to make policy                   
recommendations for Myanmar government to fully benefit the population from this                     
new development. 
 
Given the great magnitude and complexity of the topic, the paper focused on the key                             
players, the U.S., China, Japan, India and ASEAN for detailed examination. After a                         
comprehensive review of scholarly journals and think­tank articles, primary                 
government sources, interviews, and mainstream media, a systematic analysis was                   
conducted encompassing: (i) the relevance of Myanmar to each state including                     
historical relations; (ii) each state’s strategic interests in Myanmar today and the                       





This research revealed that Myanmar is the ultimate pivot state in Asia where key                           
powers collide, thanks to Myanmar’s geostrategic location bordering China and India,                     
its rich natural resources, and its potential to be molded both politically and                         
economically by other states. Competing orders should allow Myanmar to                   
immediately enjoy economic development assistance from multiple parties without                 
having to significant political reforms upfront i.e. a full conversion to liberal                       
democracy. In other words, the major powers’ intertwining interests in Myanmar open                       
up hedging space for Myanmar, and thus Myanmar is well positioned to harness                         
various benefits from China, India, Japan, and ASEAN, while retaining security                     
insurance via the U.S.  
 
Furthermore, this study points to Myanmar’s primary domestic concern as the                     
integration of its ethnic minorities. This translates into an inherent need for a                         
democratic system, which promotes equal distribution of power and opportunities.                   
Given that economic development is a precondition for sustaining a democracy,                     
Myanmar must rise above the occasion and implement the necessary economic                     



























In the last few years, Myanmar has emerged as a country of opportunities for                           
businesses and a country to visit by many travelers. Since the 2011 election resulted                           
in the lifting of some economic sanctions by the world’s large economies like the                           
U.S., the E.U., and Japan, Myanmar has been experiencing significant development in                       
infrastructure as well as international trade and investment. Myanmar is no longer just                         
signified by Aung San Suu Kyi, a Nobel Prize winner and Myanmar’s symbol of                           
democracy; the country offers itself as an attractive opportunity for other states to                         
engage with from economic, security, and political perspectives. 
 
Different countries engaging with Myanmar have different agendas to fulfill. For                     
example, the U.S., amongst several motives, aims to export its democratic ideology                       
and is interested in transforming Myanmar into a more democratic nation. China on                         
the other hand, is more interested in providing the capital to the country to secure a                               
good portion of the vast amount of natural resources Myanmar has to offer. India, a                             
9 
 
close neighbor, is a cultural influence to Myanmar and would like security                       
cooperation as well as access to ASEAN for expansion and to Myanmar’s energy                         
supply to address its own domestic constraints. 
 
With interests of other states in Myanmar increasing, the influence by them will also                           
increase in the coming years. What these states bring to or take away from Myanmar                             
will be instrumental in shaping the future of Myanmar. Therefore, it is critical for the                             
Myanmar government to understand the different motives of the key states interested                       
in the country, the costs and benefits of engaging with each one, and the resulting                             
strategic competition among the various states with regards to obtaining more                     
influence in Myanmar. This paper will address the preceding issues, especially                     
focusing on the strategic competition among the U.S., China, Japan, India, and                       
ASEAN (as separate member states and as a group) after obtaining a general                         
understanding of Myanmar, its past and today. For the purpose of this paper, strategic                           
competition will be defined as ​the competition for influence by the foreign states in                           
Myanmar to the extent their policy and actions are strategically aimed to fulfill its                           
own national economic, political, security, and social agenda​. Ultimately, this paper                     
will lay out some key implications of engaging with other states and propose                         




















Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 676,563 square kilometers in size ​, borders China                         2






middle income country by the World Bank, with GDP per capita of US$1,198                         
(current US$) ​. It is the poorest country in Southeast Asia. Of its 53.72 million                           3
population, 69% is classified as Burmese, with rest made up by different minorities.                         
Myanmar’s economy is ranked #75 in the world ​, with a GDP of US$54.6 billion                           4
(2013) ​, which make up 2.3% of total GDP of ASEAN countries, about 1/7 the GDP                             5
of Thailand. It has experienced an impressive GDP growth rate (constant prices) of                         
7.5% in 2013, with the key drivers in natural resource exports and investments, such                           
as hydropower and natural gas. The Economist Intelligence Unit projects the real                       
GDP growth to average 7.4% annually for 2015­2020 ​.  6
 
2012 GDP composition by sector shows that services (41.8%) was the largest                       
contributor, followed by agriculture (38.8%). Currently, extractive industries               
(including oil and gas, mining) provide the highest returns to Myanmar’s economy                       
but analysts predict that with increased foreign investment and access to capital,                       
Myanmar’s other industries such as textile manufacturing, construction, tourism, and                   
agriculture/fisheries stand to grow as well ​. The Myanmar government has been fully                       7
conscious of the economic potential, laying out a reform program which focuses on                         
economic expansion and foreign investment, backed by the new Foreign Investment                     











developments in the telecommunications sector, where the government gave licenses                   
to Qatar’s Ooredoo and Norway’s Telenor in 2013 ​. However, there is still huge room                           8
for improvement, as Myanmar ranked only #177 out of 189 economies in the World                           
Bank’s Doing Business rankings for 2015 ​. Notably it ranked last, #189, in the                         9
indicator for starting a business. The government’s other reform efforts include                     
floating the currency, tax reforms, review of the financial sector, and promoting                       
access to finance ​.  10
 
To many outsiders, Myanmar’s political situation is symbolized by Aung San Suu                       
Kyi, the Nobel Peace Prize winner who “personifies the Burmese crisis: its need, so                           
long delayed, for human rights, democracy, and economic development ​.” She leads                     11
the National League for Democracy party, the opposition party, which is expected to                         
“emerge with a legislative majority if the election is free and fair. ​” President Thein                           12
Sein and his Union Solidarity and Development Party is a “continuation of the                         
military regime ​” but since 2011, has been making progress via economic and social                         13
reforms, as well as in trying to secure a ceasefire between the government and the                             















world” since 1949 ​. Myanmar’s past political scene can be summarized by the                       14
military coup, the socialist period (1962­1988) and the military rule which has been in                           
power since the 1988 People’s Revolution. The army in effect has veto power over                           
any amendments to the charter, as one­fourth of the parliament is reserved for the                           
military and any changes require a minimum 75% support by the legislators ​. The                         15
key political event to watch is the upcoming general elections in November 2015.                         
There are risks that USDP may try to prevent NLD from forming an administration.                           
In any case, the political development in Myanmar since the 2011 has been positive                           
than negative, with one significant trend being the government operating in a more                         
pluralistic manner, away from authoritarianism and international isolation in the past.  
 
There is an ongoing struggle between Myanmar’s Muslim Rohingya minority and the                       
Buddhist majority. The Rohingya are not recognized as Burmese citizens and the                       
Buddhist majority have protested against granting voting rights to them. Currently,                     
140,000 of 1.1 million Rohingya are displaced after the clash with the Buddhists in                           
2012 . The Buddhist­nationalist group has an increasingly institutionalized approach                 16












Myanmar’s role in the international community has been limited, largely due to the                         
long military rule and the domestic challenges within the country. Myanmar has been                         
a member of the ASEAN since 1997, immediately joining after Vietnam, to not                         
isolate itself from the region and to improve its situation faced by the sanctions from                             




Experts recognize Myanmar’s rich natural resources, which include agricultural and                   
forested land, water (including fishery) and various minerals and hydrocarbons. For                     
example, Myanmar has an estimated 100 GW of hydropower potential, which                     
compares to the U.S.’ total installed hydro capacity of 101 GW (ranked #2 after                           
China) ​. However, Myanmar is only utilizing 2,600 MW at the moment ​. Natural                       18 19
gas production is Myanmar’s key export and will help to fuel future economic                         
growth; the sector is projected to grow by 8.5% for fiscal year 2014/2015 ​. Even in                             20
falling oil prices, Myanmar received direct investment from major oil and gas                       
companies, including Shell, Woodside, Reliance Industries, and Eni ​. Only 30% of                     21












large potential market for power infrastructure construction ​. Undoubtedly,               22
maximizing returns on the country’s natural resources and ensuring sustainable                   
extraction should be a core policy topic for Myanmar.  
 
One potential threat to Myanmar may be over­extraction or even exploitation by other                         
states that are aggressively pursuing natural resource or energy supply acquisition. For                       
example, China has already built a hydropower plant in Myanmar for its own                         
population when Myanmar’s power supply remains very low ​. China also has a                       23
2,520km gas pipeline connecting south Myanmar and China’s Yunnan province in                     
operations. Perhaps cognizant of the issue, Myanmar’s Thein Sein suspended China’s                     
US$20.8 billion Myitsone dam project after public opposition in 2012 ​. It was noted                         24
by OECD that “energy contracts with foreign investors have typically been negotiated                       
on a 30­year basis and below market prices ​,” which means Myanmar could face a                           25
situation where it may have limited energy supply for its own use in the long­run.                             
Therefore, OECD suggests that resource governance mechanisms should be                 
constructed ​.   26
2. Geostrategic Value  
Myanmar’s geographical location is not only key to Myanmar’s own development but                       










growing economies, notably sharing borders with China and India, and with other                       
ASEAN states. The proximity to these countries implies potential expansion or                     
overflow economic effects from nearby countries. For example, tourism in Myanmar                     
can increase as more middle class form in these countries. OECD also projects that                           
modernization of China’s south western provinces, China’s Yunnan province to                   
become key economic hub can have positive spillover effect in the border regions in                           
Myanmar. Myanmar is also a “land bridge” between South Asia and Southeast Asia,                         
which gives it a logistical advantage for countries that are interested in developing                         
trade or energy supply routes along this path ​. For instance, Myanmar forms a part of                             27
China’s Silk Road initiative under the US$46 billion “One Belt, One Road” plan                         
(​yidai, yilu​), a multinational infrastructure and economic development plan. Myanmar                   
also connects to “the most strategic natural waterway in the world” – the Malacca                           
Straits, which provides an oil and trade transport route to and fro the Middle East as                               
well as supply route for the U.S. bases ​.  28
3. Government­backed Reform Programs 
As a country re­opening its doors to the outside world, the Myanmar government has                           
multiple agendas to fulfill to catch up. Myanmar has identified the following 4 areas                           
as priority under its “Framework for Economic and Social Reforms”: (i) industrial                       
development alongside agricultural reforms; (ii) balanced development across the                 






(iv) improved statistical systems and data. Most importantly, it appears that the                       
near­term objective for Myanmar to prepare for deeper economic integration with                     
other states, especially ASEAN ​. The “thawing of U.S.­Myanmar relations” since the                     29
political reform is a positive for Myanmar ​, as it has allowed significant economic                         30
sanctions to be lifted and enabled global financial institutions like the World Bank to                           
start lending to the country. Regulatory reforms have allowed for more foreign capital                         
to enter, the central bank to have more autonomy, and for Myanmar’s first stock                           
market to be implemented in late 2015 ​. ATMs were finally introduced last year.                         31
According to the Myanmar government’s Directorate of Investment and Company                   
Administration, Myanmar received more than US$8 billion of foreign direct                   
investment (FDI) in the fiscal year 2014­2015 (end March 31), above the                       
government’s target of US$5 billion and almost double the amount received in fiscal                         
year 2013­2014 ​. If Myanmar is able to handle the upcoming general elections in                         32
November 2015 without much unrest and continue on its democratic transition, the                       
















Myanmar and India have shared important regional history which would presuppose a                       
strong bilateral relationship. For instance, during the colonial era of 1885­1948,                     
India’s nationalist movement and the rise of Mahatma Gandhi’s India Congress Party                       
had encouraged the Burmese nationalism, which resulted in the nation’s separation                     
from the British colonialism in 1937 through the Government of Burma Act,                       
eventually leading to the declaration of independence in 1948 ​. Myanmar also came                       33
to embrace Buddhism as its national religion, which originates from India. It has been                           
described that Buddhism is “the most central of all the primordial values that define a                             
Burman.” Given the porous borders in the region, many of Northeast Indian Naga                         34
rebels as well as ethnic minorities from poorer regions of India also took refuge in                             
Myanmar over time ​.  35
 
Despite the fact that the two countries share a 1,700km land border and a maritime                             
border in the Sea of Bengal, the Indian government had not prioritized its bilateral                           









foreign policy toward Myanmar also shifted over time, from sponsoring Myanmar’s                     
democratic opposition in the late 1980s to becoming one of eight countries selling                         
arms to the ruling military power in 1990s ​. The strategic relationship finally started                         37
to bloom since the 2011 reforms in Myanmar, joining the movement of other key                           
foreign states into Myanmar, starting with the visit by India’s Manmohan Singh in                         
May 2012, first high­level visit from India in 25 years. So far, in addition to the                               
proposed US$500 million credit package ​, 12 initial agreements have been signed                     38
covering several areas including border area development, transport, and connectivity                 
. India’s current “Look East” policy entails warmer strategic relations with ASEAN                       39
countries through increased trade, connectivity, and cultural ties ​. Under this policy,                     40
Myanmar, without doubt, is an important link to India as it is the only ASEAN                             
member country India shares its border with.  
 
India’s interest in Myanmar may have accelerated due to increasing activity by China                         
in Myanmar and the nearby regions. India is concerned about China’s rise as a                           
regional power and its influence in Myanmar ​, as it would be a direct challenge to                             41
India’s existing security and economic interests in the region. The tension between                       














was partly to “mitigate Chinese influence” ​, although the stakes appear greater and                       42
more complex today. This year, India’s Defense Ministry openly expressed its                     
concern with “China’s increasing military profile in India’s immediate and extended                     
neighborhood ​”, which includes Myanmar. In the last two years, Indian banks have                       43
been entering Myanmar, such as the United Bank of India, Bank of India and State                             
Bank of India, in a deliberate effort made by the Indian government to push these                             
state­owned banks into Myanmar in a parallel move as such made by China ​. In                           44
contrast to the uneasiness felt by India, one expert from China views that the                           
Myanmar­India relations are “not a real threat to China” and that “it is unlikely that                             
Myanmar will promote bilateral or multilateral relations with India at the expense of                         
China ​”.  45
 
With China fears aside, India’s interests in Myanmar include access to natural                       
resources as well as infrastructure development to serve its own 1.25 billion people,                         
especially those in India’s northeastern states. For example, seven Indian companies                     

















onshore natural gas blocks ​. ​India is also aiming to modernize Myanmar’s port of                         46
Sittwe and to develop the transit transport up the Kaladan River to Manipur, India                           
under the Kaladan Multi­Modal Transit Transport Project ​, which should provide                   47
better connectivity to Southeast Asia. Additionally, it is in Indian government’s                     
interest to deepen ties with Myanmar in order to integrate India’s isolated northeast                         
states which border Myanmar.  
It is very likely that India will try to emulate the Chinese way of increasing                             
cooperation in regional development, via projects that connect over the land borders                       
and create regional economic ties. There are signs that there will be more                         
opportunities for Indian influence in light of the public opposition of growing                       
influence of China in Myanmar. For example, while a few of China’s infrastructure                         
projects have been suspended due to public opposition (i.e. Myitsone dam,                     
Kunming­Kyaukpyu railway project), Indian projects (i.e. Kaladan Project) have been                   
kept despite similar opposing views ​. As suggested by the government­backed Indian                     48
think­tank IDSA, India may identify its “policy leverage” to be Buddhism given that                         
it is one of the most powerful institution in Myanmar. IDSA analyzed that India must                             
improve relations with Myanmar given its geographic importance, closer ties with a                       














its influence over humanitarian assistance, as showcased by its US$1 million relief for                         




To Myanmar, India is also a key partner, as Myanmar will want to benefit from the                               
growth of its two geographically close emerging powers, China and India, now top 3                           
biggest economies in the world by total GDP. India’s US$350 million financing                       
package from Exim Bank is highly developmental and Myanmar would want such                       
financing to be continued. The Myanmar government could use its geostrategic value                       
and security interest to India as a key leverage to manage the bilateral relations to                             
Myanmar’s benefit. Better relations with India will allow Myanmar labor force to be                         
utilized and for Myanmar companies to receive investments from growing Indian                     
corporates. Also, from a diversification point of view, strengthening bilateral relations                     
with India would be one way Myanmar can reduce its dependence on, and close                           
association with, China. Experts at East­West Center also noted that strategic                     
relationships with other foreign states, such as India, the U.S. and Japan, “offer                         























Calling each other ‘Paukphaw’ (ie ‘Siblings’ in Burmese), both Myanmar and China                       
have established strong ties for decades, especially during the time when Myanmar                       
was isolated from the West. Sino­Myanmar relation is often seen and characterised as                         
economic­centric relations, whereby China would explore resources and build                 
infrastructure in Myanmar and Myanmar would benefit from increased trade and                     
development projects. Relations have been warm until recently when Myanmar’s new                     
government, led by Thein Sein, started carrying out reforms in 2010. China’s special                         
24 
 
status is said to be challenged as Myanmar intends to diversify its relations with the                             
rest of the world now. 
 
Sino­Myanmar relations date back to China’s Tang Dynasty in AD 849, when                       
Myanmar was under the kingdom of Bagan. The kingdom was later invaded by                         
Mogol­ruled China around 1287. The bilateral relations were rebuilt in 1950s after                       
both countries became independent after suffering invasion by Japan. Notably, China                     
was the first country Myanmar established diplomatic relations with after its                     
independence and vice versa.  52
 
The two states, Myanmar and China, along with India, established the Five Principles                         
of Peaceful Coexistence in 1950 ​, which formed the non­aligned movement and basis                       53
of Myanmar’s international relations. The Five principles are: “(1) mutual respect for                       
each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) non­aggression, (3)                 
non­interference in each other’s internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefits, and                       
(5) peaceful co­existence and peaceful settlement of disputes.” ​Despite temporary                   54
setbacks, such as the anti­Chinese riots in Myanmar during 1960s, the relations                       
remained stable and further strengthened Myanmar became isolated from the West.                     









Tiananmen incident. Then, in the post­coup era since 1988, the most significant                       55
change was seen in Myanmar’s policy towards China. Some describe it as change                         56
from being “strategic neutrality” to “strategic alignment”. Since 2010, Myanmar has                     57





While being isolated from the West since 1988, impounded by economic sanctions,                       
Myanmar sought to maintain a close tie with China. The importance of China to                           
Myanmar was anchored on the Chinese contributions in the form of trade,                       
development assistance, and loans, including interest­free facilities.  
 
After Myanmar and China signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement                     
in 1989, China’s assistance ranged across key industries, including agriculture,                   
manufacturing, and power generation. For example, China helped the Myanmar                   
government to build “sugar mills, 20 hydroelectric plants, and 13 new factories, worth                         
hundreds of million dollars. China deployed additional US$346 million to upgrade 6                       








assistance to construct a dry dockyard.” In 2003, during the visit by Senior General                           58
Than Shwe in China, China provided a grant of RMB 50 million and a loan of                               
US$200 million as preferential buyer’s credit, to finance a combine harvester plant in                         
Ingone and three hydroelectric plants ​. More recently, Chinese companies have                   59
entered Myanmar to build hydropower plants, reinforced by the Chinese government                     
loan of US$200 million to construct the Yeywa hydropower plant in particular.​   60
 
According to the Asia Research Institute, “exports to China increased by more than                         
two times between 1989 and 2005, imports from China increased by five times.                         
Foreign direct investment has increased from US$194 million to more than US$1                       
billion. Loan from China was up to about US$140 million by 2005. It was used for                               
numbers of infrastructure projects such as building bridges, the Yangon­Thanlyin                   




Apart from economic assistance, China also provides Myanmar significant political                   
support, especially pertaining to Myanmar’s military regime. According to the UN                     
data, “China delivered US$5.9 million worth of military equipment to Myanmar                     









US$3.4 million of “military weapons in 1998.” Plus, the Chinese army provided                       
technical training on the use of weapons.” Furthermore, China has shown support to                         62
Myanmar’s junta regime in the international public, when it did veto a resolution                         
drafted by UN to condemn Myanmar’s human rights violations.  63
 
Supporting Myanmar’s junta regime was in China’s interests, as the regime tried to                         
exchange country’s natural resources and investment opportunities for the regime                   
legitimacy. From China’s perspective, the political support was in line with its foreign                         
policy of non­interference of other countries’ domestic affairs. For Myanmar, “the                     
future of Sino­Myanmar relations would be characterized by a stability of the Junta’s                         
legitimacy.” This had been Myanmar’s foreign policy until 2010 when new                     64
government decided to open up its country. So today’s issue on Sino­Myanmar’s                       
relations will be on whether the long established sibling relationship will be                       
challenged when Myanmar will no longer solely depend on China. Therefore, China’s                       
importance to Myanmar may decrease, if not overnight, but gradually. To understand                       
the situation, we have to look into China’s interest in Myanmar in the past decades. 
China’s Strategic Interests in Myanmar  
The Chinese foreign policy is based on the objective to acquire capital, technology,                         









with Myanmar provides China with border security as well as economic interest                       
which benefits Chinese companies especially state owned enterprises. Myanmar is                   
important to China as it exports raw materials and commodities to China and import                           
products made in China such as electrical appliances and pharmaceutical products etc.                       
The location of Myanmar is also important as it helps China to gain access to the                               
Indian Ocean and depend less on the Malacca Strait.  66
 
Realists doubt the intention of China and see rising China as a threat to the region and                                 
world, whereas liberalists welcome the cooperation of countries within the region and                       
think that regional trade can reduce the tension and threat among themselves. It will                           
benefit both Myanmar and China, as increased economic cooperation results in a                       





Natural resources are essential for a growing economy like China. China’s growing                       
population and demand for daily necessities trigger a concern about whether the                       
Chinese economy can self­sustain. It was estimated that China will need to import                         







Infrastructure development was initiated and encouraged by China’s “Go West                   
Policy” in 2000. China’s infrastructure development also flourished trade and                   
investment in the nearby regions; for example, demand for goods from Myanmar has                         
been on the rise as China increased its infrastructure investment in the Yunnan                         
Province which borders Myanmar. Myanmar is a large market for Chinese goods and                         
Myanmar is Yunnan’s largest trading partner; 55% of Myanmar’s total sales came                       
from the border trade between Myanmar and Yunnan and 80% of Myanmar’s exports                         
go to China.  68
 
As noted earlier, mining, oil, gas, and hydropower are some of the projects that China                             
has invested in. Gold and timber reserves also make Myanmar an important economic                         
asset beyond China’s geopolitical interests. Up until now, China has built at least 30                           
dams to capture hydroelectric power from Myanmar’s untapped river. China also                     69
signed an agreement with Myanmar’s Ministry of Energy whereby Myanmar is to sell                         
6.25 trillion cubic feet of gas from its Rakhine Coastline reserves to China’s Yunnan                           











China considers Myanmar as an important ally, given that the two countries share                         
similar values and patterns in human rights, freedom of speech, and democracy. In                         
fact, the two countries have been frequent targets of the West’s criticism on these                           
fronts. In terms of regional security, Myanmar is important to China as it is                           
strategically located between China and India, thereby serving as a security buffer. 
 
The “Malacca dilemma” refers to China’s excessive reliance on the strait for its oil                           
transportation (i.e. 80% of total oil supply) ​. Maritime terrorism and piracy are                       72
therefore concerns to China, as well as influence of other powers over the strait.                           
Therefore, China has moved quickly to deepen its strategic ties with Myanmar, as it                           
provides an alternate route through the Indian Ocean. Political analyst Christopher                     73
O’Hara stated, “China wants what Myanmar has — Indian Ocean access and                       
abundant natural resources to support its rise.” The previously mentioned gas                       74
pipeline project in Rakhine enables China to reserve more than 20 million tons of                           
















Moreover, the Bangladesh­China­India­Myanmar (BCIM) Economic corridor helps             
improve China’s access to the Indian Ocean channel. From central government to                       76
provincial government, China is trying to pursue different interests in Myanmar. In                       
pursuing these interests, China will have to bear in mind the potential threats to                           
stability from the ethnic minorities living around the China­Myanmar border. The                     




With the West lifting sanctions on Myanmar after 2010, China is increasingly aware                         
of other states’ interference in Myanmar and is concerned about China’s diminishing                       
influence. For example, India has moved to strengthen its security relations with                       
Myanmar through “Look East Policy” to counter China. India views “China’s energy                       
trade route with Myanmar is entering its own backyard.” The U.S. has also increased                           78
its engagement with Myanmar as part of the Asia rebalance strategy, building a                         
“c­shaped ring of encirclement” around China. China has perceived this new                     
American interest in Myanmar as a threat to China’s established role in the country,                           
and has tended to view the dynamic in zero­sum, competitive terms. The move by the                             











a strategic bugger for China, the increasing influence of the U.S. in Myanmar should                           
be a top security concern, making it imperative for China to maintain strong                         
Sino­Myanmar relations. The concern was evident in the visits by three members of                         




From China’s foreign policy perspective, the stability of Junta regime would provide                       
stability for Sino­Myanmar relations given Myanmar had been isolated and needed to                       
depend on China. However, situation has changed since Myanmar showed its interest                       
in engaging the West. In fact, Sun Yun views that China was “the most important                             
negative incentive that promoted changes inside Myanmar.” ​The failure to reform                       80
would have prolonged Myanmar’s international isolation and deepen its                 
overdependence on China.  
 
From Myanmar’s foreign policy perspective, however, overdependence on China is                   
said to put Myanmar at a highly disadvantaged position. There have always been                         81
issues about Myanmar’s natural resources are being exploited. The existing power                     
generation projects funded by China appear to benefit the Chinese provinces only,                       
without any evidence that the projects will help Myanmar’s power shortage problem.                       
Myanmar should consider the permanent environmental and social impacts brought                   





Chinese as challenges to Sino­Myanmar relations as China can no longer be the                         
exclusive for projects/investments.  
 
Aung San Suu Kyi did mention her view on China after her release in 2010, ​“China is                                 
a very important neighbor of our country, and should not be regarded as an enemy by                               
us”. She knows that if she wants to participate in Myanmar’s politics, she needs                           
China’s support to some degree. and she doesn’t want to be an enemy of China.”                             82
Being an important trade partner and neighbor to China, Myanmar does not want to                           
offend China but at the same time, cannot give away too much. Sending the right                             
message without hurting the trust is what Myanmar has to think about going forward.   
 
During Hilary Clinton’s visit to Myanmar, Ang San Suu Kyi mentioned about China                         
and told that world that it would keep a friendly relationship with its neighbour.                             83
There is a high chance that economic ties will continue to be strong but priority will                               
now be shifted to countries/companies which take care of people and country’s                       
interest. Therefore, the old strategy of exchanging country’s resources for the support                       
of the junta’s regime will eventually fade.  
 
When issue such as South China Sea dispute arises, Myanmar has been one who                           
speaks up for China’s interests within ASEAN. When facing issue such as                       
“one­China” policy on Taiwan, Myanmar supports China. While ASEAN’s policy is                     





when the issue is concerned with China. If engaging more internationally and                       
depending less on China has become the direction of Myanmar’s policy, Myanmar                       




To reiterate and reassure the good relationship with China, Myanmar’s new                     
government and China signed a joint statement concerning strategic cooperative                   
partnership in 2011. This is a positive sign for China that Myanmar indeed wants to                             84
maintain the good relationship with China. 
 
China has always believed that carrying out pragmatic foreign policy and investing in                         
the country would enhance the relations between two countries, but Myanmar has                       
been concerned about foreign influence and external interference. There is a clear                       
need for Myanmar to diversify its foreign relations eventually. Nowadays, with the                       85
lift of sanctions, Myanmar has more room to develop relations with other countries                         
and depend less on only a few countries. 
 
One would agree with Maung Aung Myoe, that neither the sinocentric world order of                           
tributary relations nor the Wesphalian world order of sovereign equality can                     






asymmetric relationship with China and now, Myanmar is in the right direction to 1)                           
continue to be China’s pauk­phaw, 2) bandwagon ASEAN community for security                     
issue and 3) diversify its relations. 
 
With Myanmar opening further to the West and decreasing investment from China in                         
relative terms, the relations between China and Myanmar may become challenging.                     
However, if the benefit of diversifying relations outweigh the cost of over­dependence                       
on China, Myanmar will eventually benefit from the new shift. Maintaining economic                       















Japan has taken very different approaches to Myanmar in the past than the U.S.,                           
China, India and these differences have shaped Japan’s various policies over time.                       
Japan invaded Burma during the World War II effectively ending the British colonial                         
rule, in the fighting where nearly two­thirds of all Japanese soldiers were killed. In the                             
post­war period, Japan felt a special obligation to Burma, consistently providing                     
generous assistance and not imposing sanctions on the country’s successive military                     
governments. Over the years, Japan has been by far the largest foreign donor to                           
Burma, providing about US$2.2 billion through 1988 and adding significant                   87
humanitarian assistance and debt relief in later years.  
 
The Burmese government also saw Japan as a major partner, as part of its “Look East                               
Policy”. However, upon the military putsch in 1988, the Japanese economic relations                       
were severely affected for three reasons. First, under the Japanese law, any change in                           
government to that magnitude requires Japan to re­recognize the country and that                       
caused years of red tape and political delay towards Myanmar. Second, Than Shwe                         
was less inclined than its predecessor to view Japan as an important partner. Third, the                             
U.S., not surprisingly, placed a great deal of pressure on Tokyo to observe the                           
sanctions, to disengage from Myanmar. As a result, Japan went from being a major                           
economic partner to a minor one in a very short time. 
 
Today, Japan is very supportive of the developments in Myanmar, such as its bold                           





as key economic reforms, allowing trade unions to form, easing media restrictions and                         
more. Japan recognizes that Myanmar needs international support to succeed in its                       
reform and therefore is willing to engage more. Japan can best assist Myanmar and its                             
continued development, as Myanmar transitions from a military government to a                     
quasi­civilian government. In fact, Myanmar constitutes a major targeted assistance                   
program by Japan and it is largely due to the potential Japan sees in Myanmar from                               





Japan is the fourth biggest oil importing country after the U.S, China and India, and                             88
ranked the fifth­largest energy consuming country, with oil consumption of nearly 4                       
million barrels per day in 2013. Lacking of crude oil, natural gas, and some other                             89
energy resources, 40 percent of its oil and gas is imported. In March 2011, the triple                               
disaster overnight effectively took 30 percent of Japan’s electrical power from nuclear                       
reactors offline, and possible power shortages. In response to this challenge,                     90
Japanese policymakers and consumers have realized the need for the country to end                         








 When considering the potential for obtaining more oil and gas for Japan, Myanmar                         
truly is the last great frontier; the country earned US$3 billion from the export of gas                               
during the year of 2014. Responsible oil and gas development and exploration in                         91
Myanmar should be allowed to advance, having access to a secure supply of energy is                             
crucial to Japan’s prosperity and stability. Japan should be promoting policies and                       
working aggressively to promote those policies that ensure that Japan’s energy                     
supplies are both abundant and affordable.  
 
Some suggest that it might not be safe, economical to explore and to produce oil and                               
gas in the region, but the fact is that it is already happening. The technology and the                                 
engineering behind some of the existing and proposed activities are advancing rapidly                       
and Japan is struggling to jump­start its own nuclear development. As discussed                       
earlier, Myanmar’s neighbors, such as China and India, are actively capitalizing on                       
the country’s untapped potential, making significant investments in the region. An                     
example is the Sino­Burmese pipeline project; the new pipeline will serve as an                         
alternative route for crude oil imports from Africa and the Middle East, allowing                         
China to be less dependent on the Strait of Malacca for its oil supply. The pipeline                               92
will also bring crude oil to Myanmar and is expected to create abundant work                           








strategic importance of Myanmar to the national and the economic security of Japan,                         
Tokyo has moved slower to increase its presence in Myanmar so far, compared to                           
others.   
 
Myanmar has set a very ambitious goal of increasing production to millions of barrels                           
a day and Japan will also have the vision to develop such a policy; this is something                                 
that Japan should be moving forward with. Recently, one of the largest Japanese oil                           
exploration companies, Mitsui Oil Exploration Company has signed production and                   
exploration sharing contracts with Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise for three deep­sea                       
blocks for the first time. Under this agreement, Japanese companies acquired                     
exploration and development rights in the Rakhine Basin, and the Thanintharyi Basin                       
which cover more than 20,000 square kilometers, located 300 kilometers offshore in                       
depths between 1800 and 2700 meters. Japan is making the case for this strategic                           93
importance of Myanmar to Japan for energy, national, homeland security and for the                         




Myanmar is experiencing some of the most significant changes since its independence                       
in 1948. Myanmar was isolated from the outside world for decades and the new                           
development path is expected to be a long and hard process for the country. There are                               





increased business interest in Yangon. There are a number of Japanese companies                       
interested in Myanmar, and many more are in active scoping mode at this stage. There                             
are always risks for foreign investors to do business in Myanmar, but the international                           
commercial interest is very strong because of the Myanmar government clearly                     
declared commitment to reform. The commercial interest reflects Myanmar’s                 
attractiveness, as a resource­rich country of around 60 million people, strategically                     94
located between India and China and the rest of Southeast Asia. As the Myanmar                           
government decided to open up economically and politically, Japan is looking to take                         
the opportunity to invest and expend its development assistance in Myanmar. 
  
The biggest difficulty facing Myanmar as an emerging target for foreign investment is                         
infrastructure, not just the physical hardware, but also the software, such as human                         
capital. Myanmar has not had the ability to invest in its hardware in roads, bridges and                               
imports and moving goods around the country logistically is quite challenging, time                       
consuming and costly. At the same time, human infrastructure is limited, as the                         
country was cut off from the outside world and the education system has been                           
underfunded and restricted. There is a very small talent pool of people who are                           
familiar in dealing with outside parties and how international business is done and                         
that pool typically consists of people who are over the age of 60 who were educated                               
and exposed to very different Burma and people who are younger, under the age of 30                               





Myanmar. There is a generational gap of people who were raised in the up until very                               95
recent system, the military­dominated government, who did not have exposure to the                       
outside world and could not get a proper education, so this human capital issue in                             
addition to the lack of physical facilities to warehouse or transport goods. These are                           
the key challenges that Myanmar is facing today, as the overall infrastructure needs to                           
be improved before global companies can set up operations.  
 
Water shortage is another major issue in Myanmar and the growing demand for water                           
with the social development is part of the problem. In Myanmar, water is getting                           
scarcer not only in rural areas, but also in downtown Yangon, where less than 10                             
percent of the population is concentrated. The water available from nearby rivers,                       
dams and lakes is only enough for half of Yangon's population and individuals have                           
to compete with factories for water in one of the Myanmar' largest cities.  
 
Japan has been very active in developing infrastructure in Yangon, utilizing the Japan                         
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) as a platform to provide official                   
development assistance (ODA). Japan has been involved in projects relating to                     
waterworks, hospital upgrades, and bridge construction and providing technical                 
assistance with the Yangon port facilities. To address the water shortage, JICA                       96








million) for the Greater Yangon Water Supply Improvement Project, to be expanded                       97
into Yangon’s surrounding suburbs and other neighboring communities, including the                   
Thilawa Special Economic Zone to improve the water supply services, and contribute                       
to economic development. 
 
Many Japanese firms have also reintegrated into Myanmar, such as Sony, Mitsubishi,                       
and Suzuki and they have increased investments and projects. According to the                       
Ministry of Information of Myanmar, Suzuki recently was allowed to build a second                         
car factory in Myanmar. Suzuki will hire more than 300 workers and invest at least                             98
US$8 million. Moreover, Japanese mobile service providers, NTT DoCoMo and                   
Telenor both have a very strong presence in the country and have been very active in                               
telecommunications since 2012. For example, both companies are planning to boost                     
their network capacity in the country nine fold. 
 
Apart from infrastructure projects, Japan has been continually giving development aid                     
to Myanmar. For example, since Myanmar became independent from the British in                       
1948, the number of people using the network has increased sevenfold, putting                       
pressure on rail infrastructure. The speed of freight trains is strictly limited to                         
12­14km/h, and trains are impassable during the monsoon season due to poor track                         
quality and conditions. Japan agreed to provide aid to update the railway connecting                         







economy and population and the use of rail transport increases. The                     99
Yangon­Mandalay Railway Improvement Project was part of the 2014 ODA loan                     
agreement which provided more than 60 billion yen to Myanmar. The project is                         




Japan has actively advanced cooperation with Myanmar in aid and economic                     
assistance. In May 2013, Japan agreed to write off about US$2 billion in Myanmar’s                           
remaining debt to Japan. Meanwhile, Japan also agreed to provide a loan of over 51                             
billion yen’s Official Development Assistance. Of the ODA loan, Japan will provide                       
up to 20 billion yen (US$161 million) for the Thilawa Special Economic Zone                         
project, the site of the future industrial zone, 25km south of Yangon, repayable over                           
40 years at 0.01 percent interest. ​The money will help with electricity infrastructure                         100
in the area and an expansion of the port.  
 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to Myanmar was even more ambitious in                       
November 2014, where he agreed to provide loans for a number of projects in total of                               
26 billion yen (US$209 million). Moving beyond the largest city, Japan also had new                           
development projects announced in the areas of improving communications in the                     







enhancement of television programs and broadcast editing equipment of the state                     
television broadcaster, Myanmar Radio and Television, as well as the establishment                     
of disastrous weather monitoring system. 
 
In April 2015, Myanmar’s government decided to end a 50 years ban on foreign                           
banks operating in the country and announced that it was going to open up nine                             
positions for foreign banks, specifically in the area of corporate banking. Three of the                           
banks that were chosen were from Japan, specifically the Bank of Tokyo­Mitsubishi                       
UFJ, Mizuho bank and Sumitomo Mitsui, a Chinese bank was also chosen, the                         
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). Other banks that were chosen were                         
from Singapore, Australia and other parts of Southeast Asia including Malaysia and                       




During the period when the U.S. placed economic sanctions on Myanmar, China was                         
especially active in Myanmar, launching projects aimed at promoting Chinese                   
economic development. Indeed, in recent years, China has provided more FDI in                       
Myanmar than any other country and an unknown but significant amount of                       
smaller­scale private mostly undocumented investment. In addition to the gas pipeline                     






Yunnan–Burma Railway and the Myitsone Dam which was halted by President Thein                       
Sein in September 2011. 
 
Japan had always been more concerned about the Chinese influence in Myanmar than                         
was the U.S., and this concern motivated Japan to continue the assistance programs in                           
Myanmar even as the U.S. cut all aid and imposed comprehensive sanctions. The U.S.                           
meanwhile considered its direct engagement with China, such as economic, business,                     
political and military for that bilateral relationship and it was less concerned with                         
China’s actions in Southeast Asia. With China’s rise, however, the U.S. has become                         
more sensitive to Beijing's influence in Myanmar. That sensitivity played a major role                         
in the U.S.’ decision to lift its sanctions partially in 2012. China's aggressive behavior                           
in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea has also brought greater attention and                             
provided a broader context to China’s actions in Southeast Asia. 
 
China has viewed the U.S.’ move to improve relations with Myanmar and increased                         
Japanese assistance as part of the second containment policy following the first during                         
the Cold War period. As a result, the views of Japan and the U.S. on the importance                                 
of offsetting China’s influence in Myanmar have aligned more closely. At the same                         
time, Myanmar’s attitudes towards the Chinese influence have hardened; the change                     
was seen in Thein Sein’s move towards democracy and his desire to diversify                         
Myanmar's economic relations away from China. Most dramatically, the effort to                     
lessen Chinese influence resulted in the suspension until later this year of the                         
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Myitsone Dam project. Myanmar has also significantly slowed the rail project and has                         
operated the pipeline that operate between two countries far below capacity. 
 
Myanmar is determined to retain its independence from the powerful check against                       
any country, such as China, the U.S., and Japan, from achieving excessive influence.                         
Myanmar knows how to maintain its independence from maneuvering among larger                     
countries during the Cold War era, as Burma was the quintessential neutral country                         
and U Thant became UN Secretary General in 1961 based on this reputation. The                           102
background of geopolitical competition of jockeying and jostling is interesting,                   
however, Japan and the U.S. should make their policies based on smart, coordinated                         




The geostrategic importance of Myanmar serves as a premier gateway to the Southern                         
China, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean, this has put the country a target of                             
China’s intervention, such as recent development of deep­water ports, pipelines and                     
roads. Meanwhile, Japan has become increasingly concerned about China’s assertive                   
behavior in the region such as its growing military capabilities. Japan’s top priority in                           
its relations with Myanmar is to strengthen security cooperation. Increased                   
cooperation between the two countries is built on common interests and national                       




military officers from Japan and Myanmar to further develop relations for future                       
defense cooperation. For example, in May 2014, Japan’s military chief, Gen. Shigeru                       
Iwasaki met with the President of Myanmar in Yangon for the first time since the end                               
of World War II, and they reaffirmed their mutual security interests, to increase                         
exchanges at every level as well as consultation on humanitarian assistance.   103
 
The current Japanese Prime Minster Abe visited Myanmar twice already, whereas in                       
the previous decade, Japan had no ministerial visits. Also, Japan invited the President                         
and Aung San Suu Kyi to visit Japan. A significant achievement on these visits was                             104
a gentle opening of an engagement with the Myanmar military, which is very                         
important because for all the reforms and the progress that have been made on the                             
peace process with the ethnic nationalities, this engagement had been missing. For                       
Japan to actually forge ahead with this, as Indonesia has also done in the past over the                                 




Japan enjoys a greater degree of trust within Myanmar both at the national level and                             
in the individual locations where Tokyo has provided relief and fostered development.                       








government to change its repressive policies and improve democratic institutions,                   
although Japanese representatives have quietly counseled Myanmar’s leaders to                 
change and in some cases have made progress on specific issues. However, a lack of                             
consistent pressure on the authoritarian regime has allowed Myanmar in many cases                       
to take Japan’s assistance for granted. It is not enough for Japan to continue to provide                               
assistance without using its enormous influence to help move Myanmar towards a                       
truly democratic institution that protects rights and freedom for its people and provide                         
them a better life. Japan needs to adopt more urgency in keeping Myanmar on the                             
road of openness and democracy.  
 
Democracy is not easy to establish through a process of reform and there will be                             
conservative backlash as evidenced in the military coup in Thailand in 2006. Japan is                           
a very pragmatic player in the region, it tends to be the country that works in a very                                   
quiet, subtle way, making way through cooperation and engagement. The leader of                       
the opposition should be very cautious and lower their expectations. With Myanmar's                       
decision to move away from the military regime towards more open democratic                       
governance, the contrast between American policies on the one hand and Japanese                       














ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations) is an important regional                     
organization which was established in 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand with the founding                       
members, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. After the 1980s,                   
Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Lao PDR joined ASEAN one after another. Myanmar                     
became a member in 1997, followed by Cambodia two years later, completing the                         
10­member association today. 
 
The basis of ASEAN was to protect security threats from internal communist                       
insurgencies and external regional threats. All of the member countries suffered from                       
internal insurgencies and regional threats from ethnic conflicts. The leaders managed                     




Myanmar­ASEAN relations are mutually independent and interrelated from the past                   
to now. As mentioned earlier, on July 23rd 1997, ASEAN officially accepted                       
Myanmar as a member. The geographic proximity, cultural similarities and                   
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comparable security situation of Myanmar impelled ASEAN’s original members to                   
invite Myanmar to participate in the existing union. Myanmar was also suffering from                         
a communist insurgency, at the same time, affected by foreign power intervention.                       
Since Myanmar joined ASEAN, ASEAN has suffered pressure from the West on                       
Myanmar issues. For example, in 2005, by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice                         
decided not to attend the 2005 ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference and ASEAN                       
Regional Forum (ARF) meetings with a “scheduling conflict” excuse, and the outside                       
world viewed this behavior as the U.S. dissatisfaction with how ASEAN dealt with                         
Myanmar issue.  
 
Myanmar and ASEAN’s complicated relations began in 1967, when ASEAN was first                       
established. At that time, ASEAN invited Myanmar to join the association, but                       
Myanmar refused to because it was afraid to lose its neutrality as a member of                             
Non­Aligned Movement. Because some of the ASEAN states were also in SEATO                       
(Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), if Myanmar were to join ASEAN, Myanmar                     
would hurt its neutrality status. As Kavi Chongkittavorn notes, “at that time, Rangoon                         
said that it did not want to join ASEAN, which was seen as an imperialist                             








During this period, both sides had little interest ​in each other as ASEAN managed its                             
own internal affairs and Myanmar retreated into isolation under the domination of Ne                         
Win government. Marvin Ott notes, “ASEAN emerged in the 1970s and 1980s as a                           
close knit club of like­minded states focused on high economic growth. Burma was                         
outside the club, out of step and increasingly irrelevant. Only Thailand, which shared                         
2,100­mile border had any sustainable interest at stake”.  106
 
In 1980s, Southeast Asia faced a need to reassess the policy priorities. A series of                             
changes in the security order took place in the region, and Myanmar’s opening up was                             
also a symbol for the emergence of a new regional landscape. ASEAN’s members                         
reconsidered their interests and adjusted policy measures to deal with the new                       
environment; ASEAN looked to Myanmar again to fortify its security, economic and                       
political position, from little interest to constructive engagement. 
  
In the early 1990s, although the domestic politics and human rights issues in                         
Myanmar were still a big concern to ASEAN, the rise of China prompted ASEAN to                             
engage more with Myanmar in 1994. After 1990 elections, Myanmar faced the                       107
Western sanctions and isolation. Therefore Burma’s State Law and Order Restoration                     
Council (SLORC) needed to connect with other organizations that would support the                       






and economic assistance. Security and economic development were key reasons                   
which led to Myanmar’s determination to join ASEAN. 
 
However, the admission of Myanmar made ASEAN suffer from many controversies                     
since. In 1996, Myanmar officially joined ARF but both the European Union and the                           
U.S. protested against Myanmar from becoming a full member. Due to Myanmar’s                       
poor human rights records, ASEAN’s existing members such as Thailand and the                       
Philippines also opposed Myanmar’s entry. But Myanmar finally got through the                     
barriers under the assistance of Malaysia which chaired ASEAN at that time.   108
 
Some scholars argue that Myanmar was treated as the 2​nd class citizen of ASEAN for                             
quite a while. Although through ASEAN, Myanmar achieved regional recognition and                     
attracted foreign investors like Singapore and Thailand, (important for the military                     
government, the country was not regarded as a “key actor” within the association due                           
to its economic sanctions, human rights issues, and domestic politics. 
 
In 2011, Myanmar government carried out a range of reform efforts in economy and                           
politics. Such progress inspired ASEAN to authorize Myanmar the chairmanship in                     
2014. It was seen as a significant step forward for Myanmar, as it supported Myanmar                             
to gain political legitimacy, and gave the state the chance to be regarded as a                             





host the major ASEAN meetings, including the leaders’ summit and ARF, with other                         
regional powers such as Russia, Japan, China, and the U.S.  
 
The Union Election Commission in Myanmar announced on July 8, 2015, that voting                         
would be held across the country on 8 November, which is welcomed by the ASEAN                             
Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR). The world and ASEAN will watch the                       
highly anticipated election as a main assessment of the country’s ongoing transition.                       
Meanwhile, ASEAN is concerned about the transparency of the election: “we didn’t                       
expect this transition to take place overnight, and a level of patience and                         
understanding is certainly necessary. But we do insist that the process be genuine and                           




Myanmar has been implementing market­oriented economy for decades, ever since                   
the economic reforms of 1988. In the past 10 years, Myanmar’s economy experienced                         
significant in terms of GDP level (21% annual growth rate in 2003­2012). In the                           
meantime, its economy is less dependent on agriculture and more relying on                       









 Myanmar’s high growth rate is outstanding even when compared to other ASEAN                       
countries. As shown in below chart, Myanmar had the highest GDP growth rate for                           
2008­2012 (Figure 2). However, this is partly due to the fact that Myanmar is still a                               
newly developing country and the base is small, which makes a high growth rate                           
possible. Despite of its fast growth for decades, Myanmar’s GDP level is still among                           
the lowest within ASEAN. Such fact suggests that Myanmar still has a long way to                             
go and a lot to learn from its ASEAN fellows.​However, comparing GDP level among                            
ASEAN members may not be a fair game, as they all have different populations (a                             
key factor for GDP level). A clear evidence is that, Singapore as a well­known rich                             









Myanmar is among the poorest in ASEAN countries in terms of GDP per capita. A                             
small figure of GDP capita not only suggests a low income and welfare level for                             
Myanmar people, but also implies an unsatisfactory productivity of the economy. ​To                      
understand why Myanmar’s GDP is still low, one should look at some key economic                           
indicators for Myanmar and other ASEAN countries. Below table (Figure 3) shows                       
that, for Myanmar, (1) its large amount of labor force does not yield proportionate                           
GDP level, implying an unsatisfactory productivity, and (2) export growth rate is                       
effectively zero, implying that Myanmar’s product and service still have relatively                     
low competitiveness in the global and regional market.  
Figure 3. Selected Economic Indicators (2011) for ASEAN Countries  111
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2. Despite of the fast pace of growth, its economic scale and GDP per capita                           
level are still low, compared to other ASEAN members. 
3. Key reasons Myanmar’s low GDP per capita is its low productivity and low                         
competitiveness of goods and services. 
4. Given Myanmar’s large labor force scale, an injection of experience,                   
technology and capital will increase labor productivity and export                 
competitiveness, and eventually boost GDP growth at both national level and                     
per capita level. 
 
ASEAN could provide a platform for Myanmar to gain experience, technology and                       
capital. Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand have been involved in global trade and                       









Trade represents commodity and service flow. While engaging in global trades,                     
Myanmar can obtain experience and technology from more developed countries.                   
ASEAN members are important counterparties for Myanmar’s foreign trade, both                   
import and export. Thailand has been the most important importer of Myanmar’s                       
goods and services, accounting for over 40% of Myanmar’s total exports as seen                         
below.   
 
It is well known that net export is one of the four key components of national account.                                 
An increase in export will also benefit the national welfare. In fact, in the early phase                               






of most developing countries, average income is low and thus the foundation of                         
internal consumption is weak. Export helps to fuel GDP growth, and ultimately to                         
accumulate wealth. To achieve export growth, Myanmar needs to leverage on its low                         
labor cost. While producing goods and delivering services, Myanmar’s experience                   
and productivity will increase, improving its competitiveness and increasing national                   
wealth eventually. 
 
The other side of global trade is import. Singapore and Thailand are still the two most                               
important trade counterparties within ASEAN (shown in below table). Myanmar                   
imported 9% of goods and services from Singapore in 2012, while 2007 figure was                           
15%. Such a decrease in imports from Singapore could have negative effects for                         







The high concentration (36% in 2012) of ASEAN members’ share of Myanmar                       
imports is also an evidence that ASEAN members can be benefit from each other                           
from the variable economic status and levels of development, i.e. poor countries can                         




In modern economic development process, capital plays an important role, as it can                         
increase productivity of labor, land and other factors of production. ​Generally                    
speaking, developing countries can achieve capital increment through two channels,                   
(1) reinvestment of what it produced last year, and (2) foreign investment (in terms of                             
debt and equity), i.e. capital injection from outside. ​A popular way of getting outside                          
capital is through FDI. According to the working paper of Thandar Khine ​, FDI can                           114
help Myanmar in the following four aspects: 
 
1. Finance new projects: As stated earlier, without FDI, Myanmar may have to                       








slow) or international debt (which is expensive). FDI is a more efficient way                         
of obtaining capital. 
2. Promote exports: More capital per labor means higher productivity, which                   
creates a “franchise” for Myanmar and eventually increase its competitiveness                   
in the global market. 
3. Transfer of technology and experience: Foreign investors usually bring not                   
only capital, but also new technology and managerial experience, which will                     
also help Myanmar’s competitiveness. 
4. Create local employment opportunity: FDI needs to be allocated into new                     










As shown in above table, ASEAN countries in total contribute about 30% FDI for                           
Myanmar, while Thailand alone has a significant 23% stake. Most of the recent FDI                           
capital was injected into power sector and oil and gas sector. Investment in the power                             
sector is highly developmental and directly beneficial for the people of Myanmar.  
 
FDI in the past two decades for Myanmar have ranged from power, mining,                         
manufacturing, oil and gas, to hotel and tourism sectors. It is worthwhile to note that                             
Singapore has been showing great interest in investing Myanmar’s tourism industry,                     
which is a great opportunity for Myanmar to learn from Singapore for services                         
industry. 
There is still a great potential for FDI to grow, and to unlock this potential, Myanmar                               
needs to develop a modern capital market, such as a viable stock exchange. The                           




There is still a great potential for trade volume and FDI level to grow between                             







Economic Community (AEC) project. The 9th ASEAN Summit agreed to establish                     
the AEC as an end goal of economic integration, as outlined in the ASEAN Vision                             
2020. This will enhance the depth of economic relations among the ASEAN                       
countries. Myanmar will also need to enhance its attractiveness in order to fully                         






o It can also lower the likelihood of trade­related dispute among                   
countries. 
● Custom clearance efficiency 












o A modern capital market, e.g. stock exchange to provide transparency,                   
confidence, and liquidity to foreign investors 
o Myanmar needs not only the market, but also the corresponding legal                     
and regulatory environment associated with it. 
● Foreign currency exchange 
o A free (or less­controlled) foreign exchange market will smoothen the                   
capital injection process. 
● Favorable land use and tax policy 
o Most developing countries use land and tax policy to attract foreign                     
investors. 




ASEAN will continue to provide Yangon with diplomatic­political support.                 
Myanmar’s military­led government should be comfortable given ASEAN’s emphasis                 
on non­interference and its interest in not seeing extra­regional countries impose a                       
political solution on a member state. ​Nevertheless, the policies of ASEAN countries                      
in terms of Myanmar’s domestic ethnic conflicts, will impact its internal politics and                         
regional relations. Myanmar’s domestic issues place most ASEAN countries in a                     
serious dilemma. On the one hand, ASEAN members insist that Myanmar is not a                           
representative measure of ASEAN’s relationship with the Western world. On the                     
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Myanmar joined ASEAN for its political strategic interest and economic                   
development. At the bilateral level, Myanmar’s key focus should be strengthening its                       
economic relations with Thailand, a key trade partner. The military leadership should                       
realize that, its domestic politics and practice, especially the treatment of Aung San                         
Suu Kyi and internal minority conflicts, could diminish Myanmar’s dividends from                     
the ASEAN membership. In the coming Myanmar national presidential election in                     















The U.S.’ interests in Myanmar date back to World War II, where the U.S.                           
contributed to the anti­Japanese campaign ​. Post World War II, Myanmar’s                   117
colonial status fell under the U.S.’ broad ideological interests of freeing Asia from                         
colonial rule. Following the defeat of the KMT in China, the U.S.’ ideological                         
interests immediately transitioned to anticommunism. Given the perceived threat of                   
communism on the back of Chinese expansion, the U.S. provided economic aid to the                           
government as well as military assistance to KMT troops within Myanmar ​. The                       118
U.S. hoped that the residual KMT forces within Burma would serve as a base for an                               
eventual counterattack on mainland China. The plan failed to materialize and resulted                       
in the loss of administrative control over certain areas in the Shan state and the                             
escalation of opium production ​. At one point, Burma supplied the majority of                       119
heroin into the U.S. In response to a growing epidemic in the U.S., targeting opium                             
production became an important policy objective. Wary of potential Chinese                   
excursions into Burma, the government under U Nu stopped the U.S. aid program.                         
The U.S. aid to Myanmar was again resumed in 1956 and lasted through the coup of                               









this allowed U Than to become the UN Secretary General in 1961 ​. Following the                           120
Vietnam War, the U.S. again resumed aid aimed at economic assistance and limiting                         
opium production. The U.S. finally terminated all aid programs after the coup of 1988                           
and the bilateral relations were effectively suspended ​. Despite the abandonment of                     121




Between 1988 and 2009, the U.S. interests and policy towards Myanmar were                       
exclusively focused on democracy and human rights ​, a contrast to the U.S.’                       122
post­Cold War strategy towards other Southeast Asian countries focusing on free                     
trade and investment liberalization. With limited economic and security interests, the                     
Clinton administration found little motivation to use political capital to change the                       
stance towards Myanmar. Such a backdrop allowed the plight of Aung San Suu Kyi                           
to emerge as a primary driving factor behind the U.S. policy towards Myanmar. Her                           
image effectively evolved to represent the struggle for democracy and human rights.                       
The U.S. consistently isolated Myanmar from the international system and                   
systematically applied sanctions in order to induce a power transfer to ultimately try                         









backseat to ideological pursuits because U.S.’ economic interests in Myanmar have                     
been minimal and the strategic interests have never been as important as states like                           
Iran or North Korea. Myanmar’s isolation following the coup of 1988 drove                       
Myanmar into the embrace of China even though it had traditionally been wary of                           
China’s intentions.   
 
Up until the recent setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. foreign policy was                         
primarily dominated by idealists and humanists. The moral struggle against inhumane                     
ideologies defined U.S.’ idealism. The U.S.’ policy goals in Myanmar were centered                       
on reform and democratization ​. Since World War II, the moral struggle has been                         123
losing ground as there are fewer tyrannical and inhumane regimes that pose legitimate                         
immediate security threats to the U.S. itself. Myanmar was one of the few special                           
states that still captured the attention of the idealists. It represented issues that were                           
specialized and popular, satisfying the West’s desire to pursue moral causes ​.   124
 
In 2007, the UN rejected the claims by the U.S. that Myanmar was a threat to regional                                 
peace but nonetheless in 2009, the Obama administration asserted that the government                       
of Myanmar continues to pose an “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national                         
security and foreign policy of the United States” ​. Throughout recent history, the                       125








campaigns; the U.S. found itself too stretched geopolitically and suffered                   
embarrassing setbacks abroad. Specifically, the U.S.’ policy objective of achieving                   
democracy and human rights yielded little results. In place of idealism, the U.S. has                           
been gradually adopting pragmatism and at the same time recognizing that sanctions                       
to induce political reform is the wrong formula.   
 
The U.S.’ main interests in Myanmar can be categorized into democracy, human                       
rights, economy, and security ​. In 2009, the U.S. adopted a new policy of                         126
engagement allowing direct senior dialogues between the U.S. and Myanmar. The                     
new U.S. posture towards Myanmar engendered a progressive process of normalizing                     
economic and political relations. The civil government formed in 2011 implemented                     
reforms and embraced reconciliations that were satisfactory to the U.S. demands.                     
Aung San Suu Kyi was freed from house arrest along with release of thousands of                             
other political prisoners. In 2011, The U.S.­Myanmar rapprochement was firmly                   
underway resulting in an official state visits from Secretary of the State Hillary                         
Clinton in 2011 and President Barack Obama in 2012. Both expressed desires for                         
improved relations based on increased cooperation. In response to reforms, the U.S.                       
eased certain economic and financial sanctions in 2012. Nonetheless, the U.S.                     
remains the largest critic of Myanmar’s government with continuing claims that the                       
new government and constitution are not legitimate ​. The stances from the rest of                         127






 A rising China that has become more assertive regionally has placed the U.S. security                           
interests in Myanmar firmly at the top. Both countries now look to leverage on the                             
convergence of interests. A more pragmatic U.S. attitude has paved way for warmer                         
relations to a strategic repositioning away from China. China has been eroding U.S.                         
influence in the region and it’s “charm offensive” has made significant progress in                         
setting the stage for reorienting the region away from a U.S.­led order.   
 
Traditional wisdom holds that reform towards democracy is opening up bright                     
prospects for Myanmar. But there exists a weak link between liberal democracy and                         
economic development for many developing countries ​. Perennial conflicts would                 128
still exist if the democratic institutions do not account for the interests of the minority                             
groups. Myanmar’s ethnic divide is well known and presents the single most                       
important hurdle for Myanmar’s development. There are 135 ethnic groups living in                       
Myanmar with the minorities primarily residing in the mountainous border areas.                     
Most minority groups feel excluded from the mainstream and are fighting for greater                         
autonomy and acceptance of their cultural and religious identities. A fledgling                     
democracy without solid economic fundamentals would find it hard to establish                     
strong institutions that can conduct peaceful integration of the minority interests ​. A                       129






conflicts ​. Otherwise, adding too many domestic electoral constraints would                 130
ultimately jeopardize Myanmar’s transition and development. Also empirically, it is                   
difficult to sustain a functioning and effective democracy under ethnic and cultural                       
heterogeneity ​.   131
 
Among the U.S.’ interests in Myanmar, promoting peace is a primary policy                       
objective. Ethnic conflicts pose an immediate threat to Myanmar’s democracy with                     
the possibility of stalling or even reversing the much needed reforms. But perversely,                         
the very process of democratization leads to increased ethnic divide ​. Through the                       132
lessons learned from previous foreign policy blunders around the world, the U.S.                       
policy makers are beginning to appreciate the complexity of the democracy building                       
process. It is becoming apparent that the right formulation starts with the                       
development of civic institutions and a strong middle class before mass suffrage and                         
the extension of certain freedoms ​. The common attribute of previous peaceful                     133
democratic transitions was allowing the entrenched interests of the incumbent elite to                       
be preserved as they fell from power. But those entrenched interests become direct                         
obstacles to the institutionalization process. To promote peace, the junta’s interests                     
must be cushioned as the regime slowly sells off its power. Therefore, it is even more                               










Myanmar with the acceptance that maintaining peace is first order to achieving all the                           
prescribed reforms.   
 
As a state which is late to the industrialization game, the entry costs for Myanmar are                               
very high while the character of the world economy is no longer conducive to the                             
most successful development model that was adopted by North Asian states such as                         
Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and most recently China. All these states retained a strong                         
level of authoritarianism until a certain stage of economic development was achieved.                       
For late industrializers, a strong centralized state with strong central coordination                     
capability is needed to extract the entry costs to the industrialization game ​. The                         134
military has played an influential role in politics since Myanmar’s establishment. As                       
morally unacceptable as it may be, Myanmar’s military, known as the Tatmadaw, is                         
the only institution that has a strong track record of delivering peace and is arguably                             
still more capable than any democratic government given the weak institutions ​.                     135
Even with a civilian government, the military will still have to play a prominent role                             
in the future especially in the face of complex ethnic conflicts. The military’s                         
political role in each country depends on the country’s historical context and the                         
nature of the civilization in which the country exists. In addition to national security,                           
the military assumes various political responsibilities including power consolidation,                 









current regime is transitioning towards a closely linked coalition between civilians                     
and the military with emphasis on state capitalism. Such regime type is actually                         
conducive for economic development ​. For Myanmar, while reverting to full                   137
military rule is unlikely, there exists an optimal mix of civilian and military                         
governance that would promote modernization and industrialization ​. The               138
Tatmadaw’s future position should reflect a type of civilian­military relationship                   
where it retains an influential role in the decision making process as well an active                             
role in the government to guaranteeing the democratic process. 
 
Most analysts have regarded the Bush administration’s foreign policy as largely                     
ineffective: unable to contain the rise of China and at the same time unable to provide                               
satisfactory leadership amongst the smaller states within Southeast Asia. The success                     
of China alone poses a great challenge to the liberal international order championed                         
by the U.S. China’s increasing economic leverage and military assertiveness cause                     
general unease in the region. In recognition of the political, strategic, and economic                         
importance of the Asia­Pacific in the 21st Century, the U.S. is rebalancing a                         
substantial degree of its foreign policy towards the region ​. The U.S. pivot is                         139
premised on the desire for a peaceful, democratic, and economically strong region ​.                       140










alliances in the region, such objective alone does not shift the balance of power in                             
favor of the U.S. As a critical regional pivot state, a shift in Myanmar’s policy                             
association will have important implications for regional balance of power and                     
regional security. Hence, the U.S.’ re­engagement with Myanmar is a principal                     
component of the U.S.’ pivot back to Asia ​.   141
 
The U.S. also recognizes the importance of the Indo­Pacific region, where the world’s                         
largest democracy, India, looks to project towards the East ​. Geographically,                   142
Myanmar is where the U.S. and India will converge based on similar interests and                           
values. As a large member of ASEAN, Myanmar has been the shortfall in the                           
U.S.­ASEAN relations. A normalized Myanmar would elevate the U.S.­ASEAN                 
relationship to the next level contributing to a more unified ASEAN that would be                           
more capable at achieving the economic and security needs of its member states ​. In                           143
a world that is trending towards multi­polarity, having influence and affecting                     
Myanmar’s transition process will be a crucial factor in achieving an advantage in the                           
new great power competition ​. For Myanmar, ASEAN provides the perfect platform                     144











While the cumulative economic and political progress in Myanmar has been slow, the                         
international structure has undergone tremendous changes. Fortunately for Myanmar,                 
the shifting distribution of power from a backdrop of a rising China is creating                           
opportunities for Myanmar to overcome its domestic political dilemmas versus the                     
need for economic development. In Gourevitch’s “The Second Image Reversed”, the                     
two aspects of the international system that affect states at the domestic level are trade                             
and war ​. The rise of China is presenting challenges to the existing global order on                             145
both economics and security fronts ​. Myanmar represents the pivot point of the                       146
challenges of the new and existing order. One of the major forces driving the world’s                             
development has been globalization. Yet globalization has been very unequal where                     
the U.S. and its advanced economy allies reaped the majority of the gains. Only                           
within the international system where the U.S. interest and norms prevail could states                         
participate in globalization.   
 
Within the context of containing a rising China, the U.S. has elevated the barriers to                             
entry into the globalization game by packaging the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP)                       
into its Pivot back to Asia ​. Such shifts portend the end of globalization as China                             147
seeks to establish its own economic bloc and construct its own system and                         









political hurdles for participation ​. President Obama explicitly alluded to the risks                     148
of China filling the void if TPP fails to materialize ​. On the other hand, China’s                             149
successful launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) signals the                     
beginning of a new economic order where China intends to construct a parallel set of                             
institutions that reflects its own interests and rules. Although Myanmar has been                       
excluded from the TPP, it was designated as one of the twenty­one founding members                           
of the AIIB. Two competing sets of international systems afford Myanmar various                       
strategic choices without compromising domestic imperatives.   
 
The international system championed by the U.S. is characterized by a balance                       
between openness and stability. The U.S. with its strong institutions and its special                         
set of endowments benefits greatly from such an arrangement. Hence a key part of                           
the U.S. strategy is to ensure free trade and open access to sea lanes. But the costs                                 
and benefits of participating in such a system are not entirely straightforward for                         
states like Myanmar. An open economy hailed by the U.S. could be much more                           
damaging without the proper institutions to defend against instability ​. On the other                       150
hand, too much economic interdependence with China also presents undesirable                   
vulnerabilities. Both the U.S.­ and China­led orders presents negative features of                     
participation. Going forward, the formation of regional blocs will be the prevailing                       









independence ​. The Sino­U.S. competition creates a complicated international               151
landscape that creates an opportunity for Myanmar as it possesses a decisive                       
geographic advantage. Myanmar’s geographic importance holds the key in achieving                   
regional integration ​.   152
 
Beyond promoting democracy and human rights, a strengthened regional bloc serves                     
the U.S.’ interests of balancing China and securing U.S. economic interests within the                         
region. Essentially through Myanmar, the regional bloc through the vehicle known as                       
ASEAN would be able to reap in the gains of globalization without sacrificing                         
stability. By straddling the Sino­U.S. competition, ASEAN would have access to                     
Chinese capital and the U.S. technology. Meanwhile, ASEAN itself possesses a big                       
end consumer market with ample natural resource endowments. Myanmar integrated                   
into the regional order would unlock trade routes uniting the region into one                         
continuous entity ​. The need to interact and to be subjected into the norms of other                             153
regional blocs would be reduced. Such a set up paves the way for a sustainable path                               

















Geography is deterministic in Myanmar’s strategic regional role. Namely,                 
Myanmar’s geographic location allows it to serve as a bridge where China, India and                           
Southeast Asia all converge. Its abundant natural resources have historically made                     
Myanmar a target of foreign intervention. It is the ultimate pivot state in Asia where                             
the great emerging powers collide. Therefore Myanmar’s politics are characterized                   
by struggles between foreign intervention and domestic ethnic conflicts. Growing                   
political, economic and informational interdependence has contributed to the                 
convergence of domestic and foreign policies. Myanmar’s current ongoing political                   
transition and liberalization presents a unique case to analyze the interplay between                       
foreign and domestic dynamics that becomes the basis of policy preference formation.   
 
Reverting to Peter Gourevitch’s “The Second Image Reversed”, the international                   
system in which the state resides in is a crucial variable in defining the domestic                             
politics. Economic forces and the distribution of power of the international system                       
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affect states at the domestic level ​. In the case of Myanmar, it was excluded from                             154
the international system dominated by the U.S. interests. Therefore it was mainly                       
China and to a lesser extent, ASEAN, which supplied the international forces that                         
shaped Myanmar’s domestic structure in recent history. As an aspiring entrant to the                         
international system, Myanmar essentially has to accept and open up to changes in its                           
domestic structure which is currently unfolding as the democratic transition takes                     
place.   
 
According to Putnam’s logic of two­level games, Myanmar balances its national                     
interest with domestic constraints. From the logic of two­level games, Myanmar has                       
little international bargaining power due to its uni­polar domestic power structure;                     
therefore, actors can do little to harness domestic constraints as bargaining chips ​.                       155
But now that its political structure has transitioned into a format that is more aligned                             
with the U.S.’ political preferences, the rapprochement between Myanmar and the                     
U.S. have opened up room for foreign policy maneuvering. By supporting                     
Myanmar’s adoption of democratic principles, the domestic interest aggregation                 
process is allowed to function and hence the additional domestic constraints actually                       
open up policy space on the foreign policy side ​. Such a link between domestic                           156
politics and foreign policy is constructed under the need for current leaders and vested                           









from the international community imposes time decay on the regime as deteriorating                       
economic performance puts the legitimacy of the regime into question. The drive for                         
economic development should dictate political transformation so as to gain access to                       
the international system. 
 
Multi­polarity presents to Myanmar a menu of strategic and economic choices. The                       
U.S.’ experiences abroad reveal that even a global hegemon has limited leverage over                         
regional issues. The extent to which international factors can affect domestic                     
structure has been constrained by strategic competition amongst major powers. In                     
such a world, the U.S. can no longer monopolize international relations which allows                         
for a more democratic international system that ironically can aggregate the different                       
interests of non­fully democratic countries ​. Competing orders will allow Myanmar                   157
to benefit economically without political reforms or fully converge to liberal                     
democracy. A more pragmatic U.S. has seen its policy objective shift from regime                         
change to regime modification.   
 
To achieve equilibrium under multi­polarity, balancing against potential hegemon is                   
needed ​. Once again geography is deterministic; Myanmar’s ultra strategic                 158
geography affords it the luxury to avoid directly entering the balancing game while                         
allowing it to benefit from the balancing efforts of other powers. Major Powers’                         






capability empowers Myanmar to avoid the classic strategic choices of bandwagoning                     
or balancing ​. Myanmar thus is well positioned to harness the economic benefits                       159
of China while retaining security insurance via the U.S. For the U.S., much of the                             
developments and strategic thinking has been framed within the Pivot to Asia                       
strategy, which the very nature of the strategy is geared towards a China containment                           
framework ​. Such framework is perceived as a zero­sum game and draws much                       160
apprehension from all states involved. The U.S. Pivot reflects largely realist thinking                       
and basing foreign policy under the realist assumptions and variables will impose a                         
major constraint on the Sino­U.S. relationship. While Myanmar certainly benefits                   
from Sino­U.S. competition, the region has more to gain from Sino­U.S .cooperation.                       
While a U.S. presence is much welcomed, at the end of the day, most states in the                                 
region are still pragmatic enough to preserve their interests with China.   
 
The Sino­U.S. relationship will be the defining factor in international relations during                       
the 21st century. According to Waltz, “international relation is written in terms of the                           
great powers of an era”. Following the 5th U.S.­China Asia Pacific consultations, the                         
U.S. and China, for the first time ever, jointly announced Myanmar as an area of                             
potential future cooperation ​. Reversing the logic of “The Second Image Reversed”,                     161
Myanmar’s domestic preferences have the potential of setting the structure of a new                         








transform the Sino­U.S. relationship out of the tradition realist framework that has                       
historically proven to be violent during the power transition process. The policy                       
options that Myanmar adopts will be decisive in how this feasible such cooperation                         
could be. In reality, China does not seek to displace the U.S.; it simply desires an                               
alternative order that is reflective of its interests. On the other hand, the U.S. is more                               
about ensuring that China’s rise does not negatively impact the rest of the world. At                             
the end of the day, both China and the U.S. desire to achieve peace, stability, and                               
development. As global powers, both sides will be accountable for developing a                       
prosperous path for the world.  
 
Conflicts of interests currently drive the Sino­U.S. relations. However, Myanmar is                     
an area where common interests and common goals exist for both powers as both                           
sides are committed to Myanmar’s peace and development ​. Myanmar’s willingness                   162
to allow U.S. and China to engage within the overlapping interests makes room for                           
attaining absolute gains within the relationship. Both the U.S. and China have                       
expressed keen interest to operationalize a “new model of great powers relations”                       
where peace is the prerequisite. The construction of such model removes ideological                       
constraints to allow the relationship to become results oriented rather than dictated by                         
abstract principles. Under such a new model, both the U.S. and China implicitly                         
agrees to accommodate one and the other by accepting differing political systems and                         
emphasizing mutual respect of concerns and interests. Traditionally, non­alignment is                   




newly formulated “model of great power relations” is consistent with Myanmar’s                     
preference of non­alignment ​. Intertwined interests in Myanmar would serve as a                     163
major pillar to this new relationship. Myanmar’s primary domestic concern is the                       
integration of its ethnic minorities. There is an inherent need for a system that fairly                             
distributes power and opportunities. Only democratic virtues can resolve such needs.                     
But economic development is precondition for sustaining a democracy.   
 
The prescriptions to Myanmar’s economic development are fairly straight forward in                     
economic terms. It is the domestic and foreign political hurdles that must be resolved                           
to implement the necessary policies to achieve economic development. In light of the                         
developments in the Middle East, the first step for Myanmar is to retain order and                             
authority to which the military regime is the only viable solution. Just like in China                             
under Deng Xiaoping, the legitimacy of the military affords the authority to pursue                         
the painful economic reforms that will deliver growth. By placing itself in the middle                           
of the new model of Sino­U.S. relations, Myanmar is given the opportunity to adopt                           
an authoritarian system of economic development. Meanwhile continued U.S.                 
influence and presence would ensure accountability in the reform and development                     
process. The formulation of a “new model of great power relations” provides a                         
conducive backdrop for Myanmar to achieve economic development and democratic                   
reform. Through Myanmar, the U.S. opens the door for China to participate in the                           
norms and rules setting process along with the U.S. while China receives a venue to                             




of Myanmar as a key strategic pivot state. By entangling the U.S. for security                           
interests, there is an implicit agreement for the ultimate transition towards democracy.                       
In other countries like China where no such implicit agreement exists, future political                         
uncertainties remain large. Economic development necessitates political progress.               
Fortunately for Myanmar, the implicit agreement towards democracy ensures political                   
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